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amendments, to receive a free flow of political information, regardless of
its sponsor; second, the prevention of undue influence by particular organizations, such as corporations, is an invalid state interest to justify an infringement of protected speech; and third, no rational basis had been
identified to justify affording first amendment protection to news media
corporations and denying it to others. If statutes prohibiting corporate expenditures in candidate elections are subjected to a strict scrutiny review
under the first and fourteenth amendments, these principles may similarly
require the invalidation of those statutes.
Linda Newman Biggs

State Taxation Under the Commerce and Import-Export
Clauses: Department of Revenue v. Association of
Washington Stevedoring Companies
The State of Washington attempted to apply its one percent business
and occupation tax' to the stevedoring services provided by respondents,
the Association of Washington Stevedoring Companies and Washington
Public Ports Association.3 The goods handled by the respondents included
imports and exports still in transit to various final destinations as a part of
the conduct of interstate and foreign commerce. In an attempt to retain
the exemption from the tax enjoyed as a result of the Supreme Court decision in Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Commission,4 respondents sought from a Washington superior court a declaratory judgment
1. The pertinent statute provides:
There is levied and shall be collected from every person a tax for the act or
privilege of engaging in business activities. Such tax shall be measured by the
application of rates against value of products, gross proceeds of sales, or gross
income of the business, as the case may be.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.04.220 (Supp. 1978).
2. The Supreme Court described the activity of stevedoring in Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90, 93 (1937), as the loading and unloading of ship's
cargo. This activity covers the distance between and including the hold of the ship and a
convenient point of discharge upon the dock.
3. A ruling of the State of Washington Department of Revenue applied the business

and occupation tax specifically to the activity of stevedoring:

"EXAMPLES OF TAXABLE IN-

. 3. Compensation received by contracting, stevedoring or loading companies for
services performed within this state is taxable." WASH. ADMIN. CODE 458-20-193-D (1974).
4. In Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937), petitioner, a Washington corporation engaged in the stevedoring business, protested a tax measured by a percentage of the business's gross receipts. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the state court's dismissal of the action and held that since the business of loading
and unloading was interstate commerce, the State of Washington was not at liberty to tax
the privilege of doing it. The State of Washington Department of Revenue admitted that
the respondents in the instant case were engaged in the same stevedoring activities that were
held nontaxable in Puget Sound.
COME:

.

.
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that the tax violated both the commerce clause5 and the import-export
clause6 of the United States Constitution. The Department of Revenue of
the State of Washington asserted that the tax did not violate the commerce
clause because the levy was nondiscriminatory and because it taxed only
intrastate activity: the loading and unloading of ships' cargo. The Department argued that the tax did not contravene the import-export clause because it taxed merely stevedoring services and not the goods themselves.
The state superior court found the tax unconstitutional, and on direct appeal the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the decision.7 Because of
the possible impact created by its decision in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady,8 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held,
reversed: Washington's business and occupation tax, as applied to stevedoring activity within the state, violates neither the commerce clause nor
the import-export clause of the United States Constitution. Department of
Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Companies, 435 U.S. 734
(1978).
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL DOCTRINE

UNDER THE COMMERCE AND IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSES

A.

Commerce Clause

The earliest Supreme Court cases considering the constitutionality of
state taxation of interstate businesses established a direct-indirect taxation
dichotomy. Those decisions invalidated state taxes as intrusive upon congressional authority over regulation of interstate commerce and ruled that
interstate commerce may not be directly taxed by the states. 9 This interpretation of the commerce clause provided a tax haven for foreign corporations conducting exclusively interstate business by allowing such
corporations to avoid business and occupation taxes permissibly imposed
upon intrastate businesses."° These decisions did not, however, prevent
states from taxing businesses such as railroads and telephone and telegraph companies on their tangible property used exclusively in interstate
5. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.

3.
6. The import-export clause provides:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties

on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by
any State on Imposts or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the
United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul

of the Congress.
Id § 10, cl. 2.

7. 88 Wash. 2d 315, 559 P.2d 997 (1977). The Washington Supreme Court acknowledged that recent trends supported the constitutionality of the instant tax, but nevertheless
held the tax invalid on the strength of Puget Sound.
8. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
9. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); Brown v. Mary-

land, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
10. See Hellerstein, State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause. An Historical
Perspective, 29 VAND. L. REV. 335 (1976).
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operations." Such levies were sustained as indirect taxes that did not inflict an undue burden on commerce. Additionally, states lawfully imposed
taxes on manufacturing,' 2 producing,' 3 and mining'" conducted within
their borders. According to the Supreme Court, these taxes did not constitute a direct tax on commerce because the levy attached before commerce
began. 15
In Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue' 6 the Supreme Court abolished this absolute immunity from direct taxation and held that businesses
engaged in interstate commerce could be required to assume a share of the
state tax burden as long as the tax did not impose a risk of cumulative
taxation not borne by local commerce.' 7 A series of judicial opinions restricting the definition of an exempt interstate business or transaction contributed to the general expansion of the permissible area of state
taxation.'" The local activity of business was separated from its interstate

11. See Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 439 (1894). The tax authorities first ascertained the value of the entire railroad line as a single property, and then determined the value of that within the state.
12. See American Mfg. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919). St. Louis levied
against a West Virginia corporation a tax imposed as a condition of the grant to carry on a
manufacturing business in the city. The amount was ascertained by the amount of sales of
the manufactured goods, whether sold within or without the state. The Court stated that
"the operation and effect of the taxing ordinance are to impose a legitimate burden upon the
business of carrying on the manufacture of goods in the city; it produces no direct burden on
[interstate] commerce." Id at 464.
13. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932). The Court held that
production of electricity was separate from its transmission across state lines in exercise of
interstate commerce.
14. See Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923). The State of Utah imposed an occupation tax of 6% of the value of the ore mined. The Court acknowledged that
practically all of the output entered into channels of interstate commerce. Nevertheless, the
Court sustained the tax after determining that interstate commerce began only after the
mining was completed.
15. Mr. Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 259
(1946), provides an analysis of the history and weaknesses of the direct-indirect taxation
analysis of the commerce clause. The thrust of his argument is as follows:
The commerce clause was not designed or intended to outlaw all state taxes
bearing "directly" on interstate commerce. Its design was only to exclude
those having the effects to block or impede it which called it and the Constitution itself into being. Not all . . . direct state taxes, can be said to produce
those effects. On the other hand, many "indirect" forms of state taxation...
do in fact produce such consequences and for that reason are invalid.
1d at 270 (emphasis in original).
16. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
17. The burden upon interstate commerce of the increased cost of doing business did
not serve to prohibit the tax. As noted by the Court in Western Live Stock, the fatal characteristic of unconstitutional taxes was that they placed on the interstate commerce burdens
that were capable of being imposed or added to with equal right by every state that the
commerce touched, merely because interstate commerce was being conducted. Id. at 25556. See, e.g., Meyer v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 223 U.S. 298 (1912); Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry.
v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217 (1908).
18. See, e.g., Department of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp., 313 U.S. 62 (1941) (a
foreign corporation's purchase and resale in Indiaha of timber to be transported to Ohio
after resale considered local transportation); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining
Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940) (sale of coal to New York customers by a Pennsylvania corporation
held local since conditioned on local activity with purchase, delivery, and consumption occurring in New York); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938) (prep-
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commerce, thereby allowing imposition of the state tax.' 9
The next major inroad against direct-indirect taxation analysis occurred
when in Northwestern States PortlandCement Co. v. Minnesota2" the Court
held that the commerce clause does not prevent a state from levying a
fairly apportioned net income tax on a foreign corporation that carries on
an exclusively interstate business from within the taxing state.2" The
Court reconciled its decision with earlier holdings, notably Spector Motor
Service, Inc. v. O'Connor,2 2 by noting that the tax was nondiscriminatory
and that it was levied only on that portion of the taxpayer's net income
23
that arose from the business activities within the taxing state.
Finally, the direct-indirect taxation analysis was completely rejected in
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.24 The decision shifted analysis
under the commerce clause to the practical effect of tax statutes, 25 measuring the constitutionality against four factors: (1) the nexus between the
activity and the taxing state; (2) the reasonableness of the apportionment
of the tax; (3) the relationship of the amount of the tax to the services
provided by the state;26 and (4) the degree to which the tax may unduly
burden interstate commerce.27
B.

Import-Export Clause

The Supreme Court first interpreted the language of the import-export
clause in Brown v. Maryland.2 8 Characterizing imports as foreign goods
remaining in their original form or package,2 9 the Court determined
whether a tax was within the constitutional prohibition by examining the
effect on the price of the imports upon which the levy was imposed.3 ° If
aration, printing, and publishing of a magazine constituted local business even though the
magazine had interstate circulation and advertising).
19. For a review of this area of the law, see Barrett, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce- "DirectBurdens," "Multile Burdens," or What Have You?, 4 VAND. L. REV. 496
(1951). Professor Barrett discusses the pre-1938 decisions, the multiple burdens doctrine,
and the case law extending to Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
20. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). The Court concluded that net income from the interstate operations of a foreign corporation may be subjected to state taxation provided the levy is not
discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities within the taxing state forming
a sufficient nexus to support the same. Id at 452.
21. Id., see West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 328 U.S. 823 (1946), affgper curiam 27
Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861 (1946).
22. 340 U.S. 602 (1951). In Spector the Court held that a state may not levy a tax on the
"privilege" of engaging in interstate commerce.
23. 358 U.S. 450, 464 (1959). The Court stated that the entire net income of a corporation, generated by interstate as well as intrastate activities, may be fairly apportioned among
the states for tax purposes by formulae utilizing instate aspects of interstate affairs.
24. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
25. In reaching its decision, the Court overruled Spector Motor Service, thereby abolishing the practice of constructing a distinction between the unconstitutional tax on "the
privilege of doing business" and a permissible tax on "the privilege of exercising corporate
functions within the State." Id at 282-85.
26. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 79-81 (1977).
27. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
28. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
29. Id at 442.
30. Id at 444.
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the tax added to the price of the goods in the same manner as would a
direct duty on the article itself, the state was intruding upon authority reserved for the federal government. 3 1 Subsequent decisions, however, ignored analysis of the effect of the tax and held that once goods were
determined to be imports under the original-package test, any tax directly
32
upon them was within the prohibition of the import-export clause.
Examination of the economic climate prior to ratification of the United
States Constitution illustrates why the Court interpreted the ban of taxation on imports and exports so broadly. Under the Articles of Confederation, the few states advantageously situated along the Atlantic seaboard
individually regulated international commerce by imposing controls on the
conduct of foreign trade that flowed into the harbors of their ports.33 This
factional and diffuse foreign policy frustrated the nation's early attempts to
establish parity in international trade. Decentralized commercial authority also weakened the Union internally by dividing the landlocked states
against the seaport states. As a result of unrestrained levy of excises on
newly imported goods, citizens of states without major harbors paid inflated prices for the purchase of imported commodities.3 4 Several cynical
commentators labeled these higher prices a "tribute" to the harbor states
paid for the privilege of consuming imported goods.3 5 The framers of the
Constitution intended to reduce this friction and consolidate the Union's
commercial strength by empowering the federal government to exercise
this power exclusively through the authority vested in a more representative body politic, specifically, Congress.36 The final consideration of the
framers was fiscal. Acknowledging the wealth to be derived from regulation of international trade, they planned to finance the new republic primarily by means of the combined effect of the import-export and
clauses. 37 Imposts and duties were to be major sources of revecommerce
38
nue.
The Supreme Court's analysis of the import-export clause reflected these
economic and political concerns. In its zeal to effectuate the intent of the
framers, however, the Court failed to recognize the distinction between
imposts and duties and other types of taxes, such as general ad valorem
property taxes. As a result, while the Constitution eliminated the inequity
31. Id With respect to exports, the determinative question was whether the goods had
entered the "export stream," that is, the final continuous journey out of the country. As soon
as the journey began, tax immunity attached. See generally Empresa Siderurgica v. County
of Merced, 337 U.S. 154, 157 (1949); A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66, 69
(1923); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 527 (1886).
32. See, e.g., Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871).
33. 3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 542
(1911).
34. 1 J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 33 (1893).
35. J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 88
(1966).
36. 2 C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10:49 (1969).
37. J. MADISON, supra note 35, at 272.
38. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827); THE FEDERALIST No. 12 (A.
Hamilton).
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of inland consumers bearing the burden of duties levied by seaboard
states, judicial interpretations imposed the inequity of import-export busi-

nesses enjoying state services with immunity from state taxation. a9
In Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages4" the Court initiated a different approach to the import-export clause. Ignoring the hypertechnical question
of whether goods were imports, the Court analyzed the nature of the tax to
determine whether it was an impost or duty. Imposts and duties are essentially taxes on the commercial privilege of bringing goods into a country.4

By contrast, ad valorem taxes are property taxes by which a state apportions the cost of services such as police and fire protection. 2 The Court
reviewed the history of the import-export clause4" and found nothing that
suggested a prohibition of an ad valorem tax applied equally to domestic
and imported goods in return for benefits provided by the state.4 4 Admittedly, this tax increased the cost of goods to the consumer, but the Court
reasoned that the cost of state services such as fire and police protection are
as valid a part of the retail price as are other merchandising services asso-

ciated with ultimate sale of the product.4 5
II.

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE V. ASSOCIATION OF WASHINGTON
STEVEDORING COMPANIES

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether
a state could levy general business taxes on the value of stevedoring serv-

ices performed within the state when these services were an integral part of
interstate and foreign commerce involving both imported and exported
39. For example, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534 (1959), an
ad valorem tax based on the average value of ore stored on public docks in Ohio was levied
on all merchants. The Court held that ores falling under the definition of an import were
exempt from the tax, while domestic ores remained subject to taxation. Id.at 550-51.
40. 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
41. Id at 287; see, e.g., May v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496, 504 (1900).
42. 423 U.S. at 288-89. An ad valorem tax may be distinguished from an impost or duty
on two fundamental grounds. First, a property tax is ordinarily imposed on all property
owners within a state, rather than levied on a single industry as in the case of an impost or
duty. Second, a tax consistently applied to both imports and domestic goods is not within
the conception of the import clause prohibition of trade restriction. Note, Ad Valorem Taxation as an "Impost or Duty" Under the Import Clause.- Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 12
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1055, 1059 (1976).
43. The Court summarized the problems that made necessary the inclusion of the import-export clause:
The Framers of the Constitution thus sought to alleviate three main concerns
: the Federal Government must speak with one voice when regulating
commercial relations with foreign governments, and tariffs, which might affect
foreign relations, could not be implemented by the States consistently with
that exclusive power; import revenues were to be the major source of revenue
of the Federal Government and should not be diverted to the States; and harmony among the States might be disturbed unless seaboard States, with their
crucial ports of entry, were prohibited from levying taxes on citizens of other
States by taxing goods merely flowing through their ports to the other States
not situated as favorably geographically.
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. at 285-86 (footnotes omitted).
44. Id at 286.
45. Id at 289.
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goods. In a majority decision, with one concurring opinion, the Court
found that neither the commerce clause nor the import-export clause had
been violated, thereby overruling Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. 4v.7 State Tax
Commission4 6 and Joseph v. Carter& Weekes Stevedoring Co.
Absolute immunity from state taxation of interstate commerce had already been removed in the Western Live Stock and Northwestern Cement
cases. 48 Further expansion of a state's power to tax interstate commerce
was provided in Complete Auto,4 9 in which the Court ruled that, under
appropriate conditions, a state may tax directly the privilege of conducting
interstate business.5" The constitutionality of the tax was determined by
examining its nature and its practical effect. 5 Four considerations entered
into this determination. The first consideration was the relationship between the taxing state and the taxed business or occupation. The Court
required the presence of a nexus sufficient to justify the state's interest in
exacting from interstate commerce a fair share of the cost of state government. 52 The nexus in the present case was ample in that respondents conducted their entire stevedoring operations within the state. The second
consideration weighed by the Court was that of apportionment. State tax
on an activity of interstate commerce that is subject to taxation by another
state unduly burdens commerce and falls within the constitutional protection of the commerce clause.53 When a general business tax is levied only
on the value of services performed within the state, however, the tax is
properly apportioned and multiple burdens cannot logically occur.54 The
Washington tax applied only to the value of loading and unloading that
occurred within the state and was therefore fairly apportioned.5 5 The
Court stated the third consideration in the form of a prohibition. States
are not allowed to apply a tax that discriminates against interstate commerce by imposing a burden that is not applied to competing intrastate
commerce of like character. Since the one percent tax rate was applied to
stevedoring and generally to all businesses rendering services, the Court
found it nondiscriminatory.5 6 Finally, the Court's analysis under the practical-effect approach required that the tax be fairly related to services and
46. 302 U.S. 90 (1937). The Court in Puget Sound invalidated the Washington business
and occupation tax on stevedoring only because the tax applied directly to interstate commerce. Because the decision ignored the issues of apportionment, reimbursement to the state
for services rendered, and the risk of multiple tax burdens, it was no longer valid as authority.
47. 330 U.S. 422 (1947). Because the basis for this decision had been derived from the
holding in Puget Sound, it, too, was inadequate.
48. See notes 16-23 supra and accompanying text.
49. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
50. 430 U.S. at 287-89. Thus, the direct-indirect taxation analysis, suffering from repeated criticism during the past four decades, received the final blow in Washington
Stevedoring, when the Court explicitly rejected it. 435 U.S. 734, 745 (1978).
51. 435 U.S. at 750.
52. Id.
53. Id at 748.
54. Id at 746-47.
55. Id at 750.
56. Id
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protection provided by the state.5 7 States have a justifiable interest in being reimbursed for benefits they provide, such as fire and police protection.
The commerce clause, then, instead of reserving all taxing powers for Congress, requires a weighing of the competing interests. The balance tips
against the tax only when it unfairly burdens commerce by exacting more
than a just share from the interstate activity. 8
In addressing the import-export clause challenge, the Court ignored the
question of whether the goods handled were imports or exports, and, following the Michelin approach, analyzed the nature of the tax to determine
whether it was an impost or duty. Referring back to the original considerations leading to inclusion of the clause,59 the Court concluded that Washington's ad valorem property tax violated none of those policies. First, the
tax did not interfere with the federal government's implementation of foreign policy.6" The assessments were levied only upon business conducted
entirely within the state. Second, the tax did not deny any import revenues
otherwise due to the federal government. The levy merely compensated
Washington for services and protection the state provided to the stevedoring business. 6 Third, since the desire to prevent internal friction does not
vary significantly from the primary purpose of the commerce clause, this
policy is vindicated if the requirements under the commerce clause are
satisfied.6 2
The Court expanded the scope of the Michelin test by addressing goods
exported as well as imported and determined that the formal distinction
between the two did not defeat the Michelin analysis. Policy considerations remained constant, 63 with the exception of the concern for protection
of federal revenue.' The state's business and occupation tax therefore applied constitutionally to unloading of imports as well as loading of exports.65 The Court noted further that the Washington tax, as applied to
stevedoring activity, occurred while imports and exports were still in
transit.6 6 The tax, however, did not fall upon the goods themselves. Citing
authority from Canton Railroad v. Rogan,67 the Court distinguished a tax
on the goods themselves from mere handling of the goods.6 8 Since the
Washington tax attached only to services, it was not a prohibited impost or
duty.
57. Id at 750-51.

58. Id at 748.
59. See text accompanying notes 33-37 supra.
60. 435 U.S. at 753.
61.

Id

62. Id at 753-54.
63. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.

64. This issue is not relevant to the Court's analysis since the Constitution forbids federal taxation of exports: "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any
State." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
65. 435 U.S. at 758.
66. The Court in Michelin qualified its holding with the observation that the state had
applied the ad valorem tax to goods no longer in transit. 423 U.S. at 302.
67. 340 U.S. 511, 514-15 (1951).
68. 435 U.S. at 755-57.
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Mr. Justice Powell concurred in the decision, but expressed dissatisfaction with the Court's analysis of taxes on goods as opposed to taxes on
services.6 9 In his view, the separation of a tax on the goods from a tax on
the handling of them at port reverted back to the direct-indirect distinction
rejected in Complete Auto.7 ° Powell also criticized the inquiry employed
by the Court to determine whether the tax relates to the value of the
goods. 7 ' Under the economic reality analysis, Powell reasoned that the
threshold question should have been whether the state was simply making
the goods pay their own way, as opposed to exacting a fee merely for the
privilege of moving through a state.7 2 Since the stevedores undoubtedly
avail themselves of fire and police protection, as well as other benefits
Washington offers its local businesses, the tax at issue is not a transit fee
within the prohibition of the import-export clause.73
Mr. Justice Powell's reasoning on this point is more consistent with the
practical-effect analysis than is the majority's dependence on authority
from Canton Railroad. The majority's distinction between a tax on services and a tax on goods ignores the standards established by the Court for
determining the constitutionality of a tax. Washington's tax was not a levy
on the imported articles shifted to the incident of stevedoring. Washington's tax was a levy on stevedoring, constitutionally permissible only because the activity had a substantial nexus with the taxing state, the tax was
reasonably apportioned to the value of the commerce that took place
within the state, the tax did not discriminate against interstate commerce,
and the amount of the tax was fairly related to the services provided by the
state. This reasoning supports the transit fee prohibition by illustrating
that the levy was a quid pro quo for benefits actually conferred by Wash69. Id at 761-64.

70. Id at 762.

71. Mr. Justice Powell stated:
That this distinction [between a tax on services and a tax on goods in transit]
has no economic significance is apparent from the fact that it is possible to
design transit fees that are imposed "directly" upon the goods, even though
the amount of the exaction bears no relation to the value of the goods. For
example, a State could levy a transit fee of $5 per ton or $10 per cubic yard.
These taxes would bear no more relation to the value of the goods than does
the tax at issue here, which is based on the volume of the stevedoring companies' business, and, in turn, on the volume of goods passing through the port.
Thus, the Court does not explain satisfactorily its pronouncement that Washington's business tax upon stevedores-in economic terms-is not the type of
transit fee that the Michelin Court questioned.
Id. at 763.
72. The Court, in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976), emphasized the

ban on transit fees:
In effect, the [Import-Export] Clause was fashioned to prevent the imposition
of exactions which were no more than transit fees on the privilege of moving
through a State. A nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax obviously
stands on a different footing, and to the extent there is any conflict whatsoever
with this purpose of the Clause, it may be secured merely by prohibiting the
assessment of even nondiscriminatory property taxes on goods which are
merely in transit through the State when the tax is assessed.
Id at 290 (footnotes omitted).
73. 435 U.S. at 764.
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ington. 74
The Court emphasized that the absolute ban of the import-export clause
75
extended only to imposts and duties, taxes paid with no benefit received.
Instead of asking only whether goods have retained their status as imports
or exports, the nature of the tax itself must be examined to determine
whether it is an impost or duty.7 6 Washington's nondiscriminatory ad
valorem property tax was neither; rather, the levy was a method by which
commerce paid for governmental services it received. The distinction between a tax on goods and a tax on services has not been abandoned, however. In the opinion of the Court, the tax did not relate to the value of the
goods, and, therefore, the tax could not be considered taxation upon the
goods themselves.77
III. CONCLUSION
Cases prior to Washington Stevedoring had determined the constitutionality of a state tax by examining superficial factors, such as whether the tax
applied "directly" to interstate commerce or whether an article continued
to be an import by remaining in its original package. Washington
Stevedoring strengthened the requirement established in Complete Auto
and Michelin that businesses must pay their fair share of the state tax burden. The Court reaffirmed that not all state tax burdens impermissibly
impede interstate commerce or fall with the prohibition of an impost or
duty. The nature of the tax and its practical effect should determine the
validity of the tax under the commerce and import-export clauses. Distinction between a tax on services and a tax on goods is inapposite in a
practical-effect analysis. The determinative question should be, as Mr.
Justice Powell noted, whether the taxpayer has received a benefit from the
state.
James W Sargent

74.
75.
76.
77.

See Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 288-90 (1976).
See notes 38, 41 & 72 supra and accompanying text.
435 U.S. at 752.
Id at 755-57.

